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Domain

1. Introduction

Hello. I'd like to welcome you to this CISP Information and Cybersecurity Online Training Class. the Certified Information Systems Security Professional Certification. CISP sets the industry standard for information and cyber security. And earning the CISP certification requires passing an exam that covers the eight domains of information security. This course covers Domain Three. Security engineering. This course is packed with a wealth of information, with over 31 lectures. There is actually one associated with every topic you see listed on this screen. Cloud computing models, virtualization SQLinjection, cross-site scripting, cross-site requests, forgery encryption, cryptography, triple-as-RC, four-as-RSA cryptography, the elliptic curve, and quantum cryptography are among the important topics we will cover. the stiff helmet, key exchange, trust models, public key infrastructure, digital certificates, and digital signatures. This course is everything you need to master security engineering. So, without further ado, let's get started.

2. Secure Design Principles

Secure Design Principles Security engineering is about building systems to remain dependable in the face of malice, error, or misfortune. As a discipline, it focuses on the tools, processes, and methods needed to design, implement, and test complete systems and to adapt existing systems as their environment evolves. Security engineering requires cross-disciplinary expertise ranging from cryptography and computer security through hardware tampering, resistance, and formal methods to a knowledge of economics, applied psychology, organizations, and the law. System engineering skills, from business process analysis through software engineering to evaluation and testing, are also important. But they are not sufficient, as they deal only with error and mischief rather than malice. Many security systems have critical assurance requirements. Their failure may endanger human life and the environment, they may do serious damage to major economic infrastructure, they may endanger personal privacy, and they may undermine the viability of whole business sectors. We will be exploring many different aspects of security engineering throughout this course, including many of the technologies used to build secure systems. But let's begin with a look at some general security engineering principles, including incorporating security into the design process. Failure of the subject-object model Modes segmentation and isolation: a critical responsibility for security engineers is to consider all of the factors that may pose a security threat or vulnerability. These types of considerations are most effective when factored into the design process from the very beginning. If a security design is a Bolton, this will rarely be successful. A Bolton system is basically a security system that has been implemented after the fact. A Bolton system is a clear indicator that the system was an afterthought to the initial design. In reality, security design is not the last measure of defense, but rather the first, and one that should be implemented throughout. One of the more well-known security models is the subject object model. In an access request, the subject is the person, device, or application that is requesting access to a resource. The object of an access control request is the resource that the subject wishes to access. There are many different types of objects. Basically, anything that you might want to control access to can then be the object of an access control request. For example, files stored on a file server might have access permissions set on them. In that case, anytime a user, application, or device requests access to one of those files, the file is the object of the access request. Another example would be requesting access to the memory. In this example, the process would be the subject, and the memory would be the object. Even when secure design principles are implemented, there is always the risk of a system failure. How the system should behave in the event of a failure is the topic of failure modes. Essentially, there are two possible failure modes. The first failure mode is the failopen system. When a security control failure occurs in a failopen system, the controls are automatically bypassed, which presents an inherent risk. It does provide the added benefit of business continuity, so long as the business continuity planners have taken a calculated fault tolerance level into consideration, at which point the fail-open system would be acceptable. A failed secure system, on the other hand, locks itself into a state where no access is granted. If the security control fails, this will seize all operations, and from a business continuity perspective, this is unfavorable. However, it is a more cautious approach to security because it allows security engineers to investigate the incident. You will have noticed that in both the failopen and failsecure modes, there is an important decision that needs to be made with respect to security versus business continuity. And this touches on an important topic: security engineers having to wear multiple hats. On the one hand, they are security leaders, and on the other hand, they are business leaders. So let's take a closer look at some real-world examples of both the failopen and failsecure secure mode.In this example, we have our internal network connected to the Internet, with network traffic flowing through the firewall. If we were to set the system up in fail-open mode, a failure in the firewall would result in continued operation. However, there would be no firewall protection. It should be noted, however, that this is an option most firewalls are preset to by default, meaning the flow of traffic through the firewall would be denied. Plus, operating without firewall protection is clearly not a secure approach. Now, let's consider a failed secure state. An intrusion detection system is a device or software application that monitors a network or system for malicious activity or policy violations. Security engineers may elect to continue operations even if the intrusion detection system fails so as to not disrupt business operations. An integral part of designing secure systems is to ensure that if one component of a system is compromised, the risk to other systems or components is mitigated. This is where the concept of isolation and segmentation comes into play. Network segmentation is the practise of splitting a computer network into subnetworks, each being a network segment. Isolation and segmentation yield improved security. So how does it do this? For one thing, it improves security because broadcasts are limited to the local network. Internal network structure will notbe visible from the outside. Next, there is a reduced attack surface available to pivot into if one of the hosts on the network segment is compromised. Common attack vectors such as LMNR and NetBIOS poisoning can be partially alleviated by proper network segmentation, as they only work on the local network. For this reason, it is recommended to segment the various areas of the network by usage. A basic example would be to split up web servers, database servers, and standard user machines, each into their own segments. Finally, by creating network segments containing only the resources specific to the consumers that you authorise access to, you are creating an environment of least privilege. Process isolation is a set of different hardware and software technologies designed to protect each process from other processes on the operating system. It does so by preventing Process A from writing to Process B. Process isolation can be implemented with virtual address spaces. Where process A's address space differs from process B's, preventing process A from writing onto process B's security is easier to enforce by disallowing interprocess memory access than in less secure architectures such as Dos, where any process can write to any memory in any other process. Memory segmentation is the division of computer primary memory into segments or sections. In a computer system using segmentation, a reference to a memory location includes a value that identifies a segment and an offset or memory location within that segment.

3. Security Models

Security models of control are used to determine how security will be implemented, what subjects can access the system, and what objects they will have access to. Security models of control are typically implemented by enforcing integrity, confidentiality, or other controls. Keep in mind that each of these models lays out broad guidelines and is not specific in nature. It is up to the developer to decide how these models will be used and integrated into the specific designs. In this lesson, we will discuss multi-level security. the Bell lapadula model and the Biba model. Both the Bella Padula and Biba models are designed to provide security within the context of multi-level systems. Multi-level security simply means that a single computing system might be used to store, process, and transmit information of different classification levels, and the users of that system might have different security clearances. For example, an assistant might handle confidential, secret, and top-secret information, even though some using the system don't have a top-secret security clearance. The Bella Padula model is a state machine model used for enforcing access control in government and military applications. It was created by David Elliott Bell and Leonard La Padula in response to Roger Shell's strong advice to formalise the US. Department of Defense multilevel security policy The model is a formal straight transition model of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules that use security labels on objects and clearances for subjects. Security labels range from the most sensitive, for example, "top secret," down to the least sensitive, for example, "unclassified" or "public." The Bella Padua model is an example of a model where there is no clear distinction between protection and security. The Bella Padula model is defined by the following three properties: simple security property This property states that a subject at one level of confidentiality is not allowed to read information at a higher level of confidentiality. This is sometimes known as the "no read up." The second property is the Star security property. This property states that a subject with one level of confidentiality is not allowed to give information to a subject with a lower level of confidentiality. This is also known as "no-write down." The third property is the Strong Star property, and this property states that a subject cannot read or write to objects of higher or lower sensitivity. Here we have a visual representation of the various properties under the Belt-La Padula model. In column one, we have the Simple Security Property, which states that there is no readup. Therefore, a person with secret security clearance cannot read up to top secret level. The second column, the star property, states that there is no write down, which means that someone with secret clearance cannot write down to an object C with confidential clearance. The third column is the Strong Star property. This property states that the subject cannot read or write to an object of higher or lower sensitivity, which is why we have the X's going from B both to A and to object C. The Biba Integrity Model, developed by Kenneth Biba, is a formal state transition system of computer security policy that describes a set of access control rules designed to ensure data integrity. Data and subjects are grouped into ordered levels of integrity. The model is designed so that subjects may not corrupt data from a level that ranks higher than the subject or be corrupted by data from a lower level than the subject. In general, the model was developed to address integrity as a core principle, which is the direct reverse of the Bella Padula model. The Beaver model has the following three defining properties. The Simple Integrity Property This property states that a subject at one level of integrity is not permitted to read an object of lower integrity. The start. Integrity property. This property states that an object at one level of integrity is not permitted to write to an object of higher integrity via the invocation property. This property prohibits a subject at one level of integrity from invoking a subject at a higher level of integrity. Here we have a visual representation of the Biba model. And in column one, we have the SimpleIntegrity property, which states that a subject at one level of integrity is not permitted to read or write an object of lower integrity. So a person in the middle, for example, object B, cannot read the level of an object level.For object C in the second column, we have the star integrity property, which states that an object at one level of integrity is not permitted to write to an object of higher integrity. So object B is not able to write to object A. One easy way to remember these rules is to note that the star property in both Biba and Bella Padula deals with rights. Just remember, it's written in the stars. Another helpful tip is to remember the purpose of the Biba model. Just keep in mind that the I in Biba stands for integrity. Bye.

4. Security Requirements

Security requirements. When we look at the origins of information and cyber security, we can see that it was heavily designed and implemented at the government level long before it was tackled head-on in the private sector. The trusted computer system evaluation criteria is a standard from the United States Department of Defense that discusses rating security controls for computer systems. It is also often referred to as the Orange Block. The standard was originally released in 1083 and updated in 1985 before being replaced by the Common Criteria Standard in 2005. The Orange Book standard includes four toplevel categories of security: minimal security, discretionary protection, mandatory protection, and verified protection. In this standard, security begins at the lowest levels with an access control mechanism and ends in the highest class with a mechanism that a clever and determined user cannot circumvent. The Orange Book also defines a trusted system and measures trust in terms of security policies and assurance. TC SEC measures accountability according to independent verification, authentication, and ordering. The TC SEC, or Orange Book, is part of a rainbow series of different manuals put out by US federal government agencies, so named for their colourful printed covers. So let's quickly summarise what we learned. The TC SEC is the Department of Defense's trusted computer system information criteria. It was issued in 1983 and later referred to as the "Orange Book" by the IDF community. It is no longer used, and it was replaced by the Common Criteria in 2005. The Common Criteria is an international set of guidelines and specifications developed for evaluating information security products specifically to ensure they meet an agreed-upon security standard for government deployments. Common criteria is more formally called "common criteria" for information technology security evaluation. The common criteria has two key components: protection profiles and evaluation assurance levels. A Protection Profile, otherwise known as PPRO, defines a standard set of security requirements for a specific type of product, such as a firewall. The Evaluation Assurance Level defines how thoroughly the product is tested. Evaluation assurance levels are scaled from one to seven, with one being the lowest level of evaluation and seven being the highest level of evaluation. A higher level of evaluation does not mean the product has a higher level of security; it only means the product went through more tests. To submit a product for evaluation, the vendor must first complete a security target description, which includes an overview of the product and its security features, an evaluation of potential security threats, and the vendor's self-assessment, detailing how the product conforms to the relevant protection profile, and then the vendor chooses to test it again. The laboratory then tests the product to verify its security features and evaluates how well it meets the specifications defined in the protection profile. The results of a successful evaluation form the basis for an official certification of the product. The goal of the Common Criteria Certification is to assure customers that the products they are buying have been evaluated and that the vendor's claims have been verified by a vendor-neutral third party. Three standards inspired the common criteria. ItSEC is the European standard developed in the early 1990s by France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. CTC PEC, the Canadian standard, followed the USDoD standard but avoided several problems that were identified jointly by evaluators from both the US and Canada. The CTC PEC standard was first published in May 1993 by the United States Department of Defense. The OrangeBook and Parts of the Rainbow series are names for the OD 5200 standard. The Orange Book grew out of computer security research, such as the Anderson Report conducted by the National Security Agency and the National Bureau of Standards in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The central thesis of The Orange Book follows from the work done by Dave Bell and Len Lapadula. For a set of protection mechanisms, the government uses a certification and accreditation process to determine whether the system may be used in the government's system. Certification and accreditation at the government level are not only very complicated but also very confidential. It also goes well beyond the scope of this course. To get a better understanding of certification and accreditation, we will use the commercial level of certification and accreditation to describe what it is and how it is utilised in the real world. An example of certification is the comprehensive technical evaluation of the security components and their compliance. For the purpose of accreditation, a certification process may use safeguard evaluation, risk analysis, verification, testing, and auditing techniques to assess the appropriateness of a specific system. For example, suppose Dan is the security officer for a company that just purchased new systems to be used to process its confidential data. He wants to know if these systems are appropriate for these tasks and if they are going to provide the necessary level of protection. He also wants to make sure they are compatible with the current environment, do not reduce productivity, and do not open new doors to new threats. Basically, he wants to know if these are the right products for his company. He could pay a company that specialises in these matters to perform the necessary procedures to certify the systems, but he wants to carry out the process internally. The evaluation team will perform tests on the software configurations, hardware firmware design, implementation, system procedures, and physical and communication controls. The goal of the certification process is to ensure that the system, product, or network is right for the customer's purposes. Customers will rely upon a product for slightly different reasons, and environments will have various threat levels, so a particular product is not necessarily the best fit for every single customer out there. Of course, vendors will try to convince you otherwise. The product has to provide the right functionality and security for the individual customer, which is the whole purpose of the certification process. The certification process and corresponding documentation will indicate the good, the bad, and the ugly about the product and how it works within the given environment. Dan will take these results and present them to his management for the accreditation process. Accreditation is a formal acceptance of the adequacy of the system's overall security and functionality by managers. The certification information is presented to management or the responsible body, and it is up to management to ask questions, review the reports and findings, and decide whether to accept the product and whether any corrective action needs to be taken place.Once satisfied with the system's overall security as presented, management makes a formal accreditation statement. By doing this, management is stating that it understands the level of protection the security system will provide in its current environment and understands the security risks associated with installing and maintaining the system. With that having been said, here is a very helpful tip for you to remember. Certification is a technical review that assesses the security mechanisms and evaluates their effectiveness. Accreditation, however, is the management's official acceptance of the information and the certification process. Findings: There are four options available to an accreditation authority when making an accreditation decision. A full authorization to operate is valid for three years. Alternatively, if there are some security issues that need to be addressed but are not significant enough to grant authorization, the authorization authority may grant an interim authorization to operate. This would grant authorization while providing a six-month window to address any security issues that the authorising authority deemed needed to be addressed. If an interim authorization test is granted, then the system may be used for test purposes only. The final accreditation decision is a denial of authorization to operate. With a denial of authorization, the use of the system is entirely prohibited.

5. Virtualization

Virtualization refers to the creation of a virtual resource such as a server, desktop, operating system, file storage, or network. The main goal of virtualization is to manage workloads by radically transforming traditional computing to make it more scalable. Virtualization has been part of the IT landscape for decades now, and today it can be applied to a wide range of system layers, including operating system level virtualization, hardware level virtualization, and server level virtualization. We'll discuss virtualization in further detail, but first let's consider the technology landscape that has led up to virtualization. From the 1950s to the 1970s, a US consortium known as the IBM and Seven Dwarfs, which included Honeywell and General Electric, developed mainframe computers that dominated the next few decades. Mainframe computers are computers used primarily by large organisations for critical applications and bulk data processing such as census, industry and consumer statistics, enterprise resource planning, and transaction processing. These mainframe computers were the backbone to the data centres for many years. As technology advanced, the client-server model emerged in the 1980s, and the client-server model had several unique and distinctive advantages. The first advantage is centralization of control. It provides access to resources and ensures the integrity of the data that is controlled by the dedicated server so that a programme or an unauthorised client cannot damage the system. This centralization also facilitates the task of updating data or other resources. The second advantage is scalability. You can actually increase the capacity of clients and services separately. Any element can be increased or enhanced at any time. Or you can add new nodes to the network, for example, clients or services. A third advantage is that it has easy maintenance that allows you to distribute the roles and responsibilities to several standalone computers. You can replace, repair, upgrade, or even move a server, while customers will not be affected by that change, or they'll be minimally affected. This independence of the change is also known as encapsulation. While the client-server model has many advantages, its shortcomings are significant. For one, it's resulted in wasted resources due to the nature of internet traffic. Servers were sitting idle for extended periods of time. It was only when there was a spike in network traffic that the servers would be utilised at an acceptable level. There was clearly demand for a more efficient method, and it was around that time that virtualization technology became available. Virtualization allowed many different virtual servers to make use of the same underlying hardware. The clear-cut advantage of utilising a shared hardware platform is that it allows a shift of memory, storage, and processing power to wherever it's needed most at any given time. VMware is a perfect example of a virtualization platform that makes this possible. So how does virtualization work exactly? Software-based "hypervisors" separate the physical resources from the virtual environment. the things that need those resources. Hypervisors can sit on top of the operating system like on a laptop or be installed directly onto hardware like a server, which is how most enterprises virtualize hypervisors Take your physical resources and divide them up so that the virtual environments can use them. Resources are partitioned as needed from the physical environment to the many virtual environments users interact with and run computations within the virtual environment.Typically called a guest machine or virtual machine, the virtual machine functions as a single data file, and like any digital file, it can be moved from one computer to another, opened in either one, and expected to work the same. When the virtual environment is running and a user or programme issues an instruction that requires additional resources from the physical environment, The hypervisor released the request to the physical system and cached the changes. which all happens at close to native speed. particularly if the request is sent through an open source hypervisor based on KVM. The Kernel based Virtual Machine let'sdiscuss the types of virtualization first. Starting with data virtualization, data that is scattered all over can be consolidated into a single source. Data virtualization allows companies to treat data as a dynamic supply, providing processing capabilities that can bring together data from multiple sources, easily accommodate new data, and transform data according to user needs. Data virtualization tools like Red Hat JBoss Data Virtualization sit in front of multiple data sources and allow them to be treated as single sources, delivering the needed data in the required form at the right time to any application or user. Next. There's desktop virtualization. This is easily confused with operating system virtualization, which allows you to deploy multiple operating systems on a single machine. Desktop virtualization allows a central administrator or automated administration tool to deploy simulated desktop environments to hundreds of physical machines at once. Unlike traditional desktop environments that are physically installed, configured, and updated on each machine, desktop virtualization allows admins to perform mass configurations, updates, and security checks on all virtual desktops. Next we have server virtualization. Servers are computers designed to process a high volume of specific tasks really well, so other computers like laptops and desktops can do a variety of other tasks. Virtualizing a server lets it do more of those specific functions and involves partitioning it so that the components can be used to serve multiple functions. Next we have operating system virtualization. Operating system Virtualization happens at the kernel, which is essentially the central task manager of operating systems. It's a useful way to run Linux and Windows environments side by side. Enterprises can also push virtual operating systems onto computers, which reduces bulk hardware costs since the computers don't require such high out-of-the-box capabilities. It increases security, since all virtual instances can be monitored and isolated, and it limits time spent on it. It also provides services like software updates for security professionals. Virtualization poses a number of legitimate security concerns around virtual machine isolation. In a physical server environment, each server runs on its own dedicated processor and memory resources. If a malicious attacker compromises the machine, that event is limited to that particular machine. In a virtualized environment, however, a malicious attacker may break out of the virtualized guest operating system and therefore pose an immediate threat to other systems as well. This type of attack is known as VM Cape Tech.

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